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Do synergies exist in related acquisitions? - A meta-analysis of acquisition studies 
 
 
Abstract:  
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) aim to increase wealth for shareholders of the acquiring 
company, in particular by creating synergies. It is often assumed that relatedness is a source of 
synergies. Our study distinguishes between business, cultural, technological and size 
relatedness. It discusses the reasons why these different forms of relatedness can lead to an 
acquisition success and conducts a meta-analysis of 67 prior M&A studies. Results indicate 
that positive effects can be expected under specific conditions only and have a limited overall 
impact on acquisition success. A moderator analysis finds that synergies stemming from 
relatedness depend on industry-, country-, and investor-characteristics. (127 words)  
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1. Introduction 
Acquisitions are a specific type of investment and, as shown in figure 1, acquisitions often 
occur in peaks (Bruner 2002; 1986). The recent peaks took place in 2000 and 2006 with 
worldwide deals climbing above bn $3000 (Tschöke and Csanad 2007).  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
The most common argument for pursuing acquisitions is to increase the wealth for 
shareholders of the acquiring company (Tuch and O'Sullivan 2007): Acquisitions can create 
synergies, increase a firm’s market share and bargaining power, or lead to improved risk 
diversification. Nonetheless, a large number of M&A are considered as failures and do not 
increase shareholder wealth. While Bruner (2002; 2005) talks about 30% of deals failing, 
Jansen estimates 50%-75%. Overall, the majority of empirical literature on bidder 
performance in acquisitions has failed to provide consistent evidence for increased 
shareholder wealth (Tuch and O'Sullivan 2007). After reviewing the M&A literature focusing 
on merger policy in the US in great detail Mueller (1997) concludes: “It is possible, judging 
from the available evidence on the effects of mergers, that the US economy would be as or 
even more efficient today, if there had been no mergers over the last 50 years.” Sudarsanam 
(1995) finds for the UK market that takeover gains are at best neutral for shareholders1. 
The literature on M&A explains the failure of deals due to a false evaluation of potential 
synergies when companies merge with or acquire other corporations (Köppen and 
Knyphausen-Aufseß 2004; Roll 1986; Sirower 2001). Synergies may have different sources. 
Financial synergies arise by reducing the cost of capital of the firm, e.g.by tax benefits or 
improved leverage (Chatterjee 1986). Other sources of synergies are larger economies of scale 
and scope, enhanced efficiency or the access to new markets, new customers or new 
technologies (Rumelt 1974; Salter and Weinhold 1978). In this paper we do not explicitly pay 
                                                 
1
  Sudarsanam’s 1995 review includes only four prior studies. His conclusions should be considered with care.  
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attention to synergies arising from economies of scope, instead we focus on synergies that 
arise due to relatedness, because in M&A projects the relatedness argument is far more 
common.  
Usually, it is expected that synergies are highest in related acquisitions (Healy et al. 1997: 
45). They are often a negotiating point between buyer and seller that impacts the final price 
both parties agree on. Therefore, corporate synergies have to be forecasted through careful 
estimations in order to protect shareholders from significant wealth destruction in 
acquisitions.  
To forecast synergies the degree of similarity between two firms is often used (Lubatkin and 
Srinivasan 1997).2 It is assumed that in the case of so called “related” acquisitions the 
management has a sound understanding of the acquired firm because of its similarity 
(Flanagan and O'Shaugnessy 2003). However, relatedness can embrace different sources 
which can be divided into business, cultural, technological and size relatedness. The effect of 
these four sources of synergies is unclear. This might explain why some authors find strong 
positive effects between relatedness and the profitability of acquisitions (Flanagan 1996; 
Healy et al. 1997; Morck et al. 1990; Singh and Montgomery 1987), whereas others diagnose 
the opposite (Hambrick and Cannella 1993; Limmack and McGregor 1995; Sudarsanam et al. 
1996). 
Our study contributes to M&A research by answering the question as to when relatedness is a 
source of potential synergies. We first summarize prior research results on the effect of 
relatedness on the success of M&A. Secondly, in a meta-analysis, we determine the degree to 
which shareholder wealth can be explained by business, cultural, technological and size 
relatedness. Our overall findings indicate that commonly agreed sources of synergies seem to 
                                                 
2
 This is in contrast to financial synergies, where dissimilarity of firms is considered to be the most important 
source of benefits (Chatterjee 1986). “In sum, mergers of similar firms tend to have greater financial synergies 
when the correlation of cash flows is low and volatilities are somewhat lower than the base case” (Leland 2007). 
Unfortunately, cash flows in related acquisitions tend to be correlated by definition because the acquisition takes 
place in a similar or at least linked business. That is why financial synergies are most likely to be achieved in 
unrelated diversification. 
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have only a small impact. Relatedness does not automatically increase shareholder wealth. 
Simply referring to similar business concepts, cultures, technologies or sizes is not adequate 
for forecasting synergies. Our detailed analysis of how relatedness influences different 
performance measurements and of how its influence varies depending on different regions or 
industries, leads to the conclusion that relatedness can be a source of wealth creation as well 
as of wealth destruction. As a consequence more attention should be paid to different 
performance measures (and thus to different investor types) and to the contingencies under 
which relatedness increases or decreases the performance of firms engaging in M&A activity. 
In the following sections, we develop a set of hypotheses regarding mechanisms through 
which relatedness affects M&A performance and test them using meta-analytic techniques. 
The meta-analytic approach provides an integration of the previous body of work and may 
help explain the inconsistent findings obtained in previous studies.  
In section 2 we present arguments and empirical evidence for synergies that may arise from 
the aforementioned four forms of relatedness. In section 3 we describe the meta-analytic 
method. The major difference to prior meta-analyses is that our meta-analysis compares the 
effect of four relatedness dimensions on acquisition performance and acknowledges the multi-
dimensionality of acquisition performance. In addition to the standard accounting and market 
based indicators we employ knowledge indicators such as patents, new product developments 
and others. Section 4 presents the statistical results. Section 5 discusses the findings. Section 6 
concludes that other explanations for the negligible overall effect of relatedness on acquisition 
success should be combined with the relatedness-hypothesis. 
2. Literature Review and Research Framework 
In the following we do not distinguish between the various ways of acquiring control rights3 
                                                 
3
 According to Jensen and Ruback (1983) a takeover is defined as a transfer of the target’s control rights from 
the target’s management team to the bidding firm’s management. Such activities takes place on the market for 
corporate control: managers’ fears of becoming a target acts as a control mechanism effectively aligning their 
interests with those of the shareholders.  The term “acquisition” is a mere purchase (of control rights) whereas 
  
6 
because this distinction is important only to lawyers, accountants and tax specialists, and less 
relevant  in terms of its economic impact. (Bruner 2002: 1). Consequently, we use the general 
term “mergers and acquisitions” (M&A) or simply “acquisition”.4  
Figure 2 presents the model guiding this study. It focuses on synergy realization due to similar 
patterns of resource allocations and similar dominant logics (Harrison et al. 1993; Prahalad 
and Bettis 1986) as reflected in M&A performance. Rumelt (1974) was among the first to 
distinguish different levels of relatedness ranging from the single business firm to the 
conglomerate firm5. He finds that related diversifiers perform better than unrelated ones. This 
study triggered a host of empirical research analyzing the relatedness-performance 
relationship6.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
The M&A-literature discusses the impact of four major kinds of relatedness on acquisition 
success: business relatedness (Kusewitt 1985; Rumelt 1974), size relatedness (Hagedoorn and 
Duysters 2002; Hitt et al. 1991), cultural relatedness (Buono et al. 1985; Chatterjee et al. 
1992), and technological relatedness (Cassiman et al. 2005; Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002). 
In the following sections we review the hypothesized impact of each kind of relatedness on 
acquisition success. 
As shown in Figure 2, in the empirical analysis we will test for the effects of relatedness on 
                                                                                                                                                        
the term “merger” describes the combination of two firms to one legal entity that have been different legal 
entities before (see e.g. Bruner 2005: 1). Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) define a merger as an offer made to the 
target’s management. The merger offer leads to bargaining between the two parties. Negotiations take place in 
relative secrecy. In contrast, a tender offer is made directly to the target’s shareholders and conveys more 
information to the public. Another way to acquire control over a target firm is the proxy contest in which the 
amount of voting rights is decisive (Bebchuk and Hart 2001). 
4
 Most of the studies we included in the meta-analysis do also not explicitly distinguish between acquisitions and 
mergers and use the general term M&A. Other authors treat M&A the same way (e. g. Gugler et al. 2003).  
5
 Rumelt’s typology includes the major categories: dominant business, related constrained, related linked and 
unrelated (conglomerate) businesses and has been applied in various studies Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989, 
Bettis and Hall 1982, Montgomery and Singh 1987. 
6
 For example, Datta et al. (1991) review the literature on diversification and find inconclusive evidence. Palich 
et al. (2000) conduct a meta-study and establish an inverted U-curve, i. e. diversification is profitable when a 
firm has been a single business firm and then diversifies into related businesses. But diversification lowers 
profitability when the firm switches from related to unrelated diversification. In the following sections we 
present some conflicting findings on effects of the relatedness variables on acquisition performance. 
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different performance types, commonly measured in terms of shareholder value, accounting-
based performance, amount of skill transfer and combination, overall acquisition 
performance, and the divestment of the acquired company by the parent. In addition we 
develop other performance classifications for buyer and target. Finally, we test for moderating 
effects.  
2.1. Business relatedness 
Business relatedness concerns acquisitions in similar markets and industries. The idea is to 
transfer knowledge generated in the old business to the newly acquired one. Existing 
knowledge facilitates a realistic estimation of operational synergies, reduces unit costs due to 
the use of existing distribution canals for products and protects from overpayments 
(Montgomery and Singh 1987). It also reduces risk because income streams become more 
stable when acquisitions occur in related product markets (Salter and Weinhold 1978). 
Furthermore, the number of potential rivals decreases and the market power of the combined 
firm increases. Practitioners follow this line of thought (Reuters 2007). 
 Results on the profitability of the acquisition of related businesses are mixed. Using ROA as 
a dependent variable Kusewitt (1985) finds a positive effect in related acquisitions. Pennings 
et al. (1994) and Miller (2006) find similar effects employing return on capital, R&D intensity 
and ROA as dependent variables. Davis et al. (1992) conclude that both market and 
production relatedness provide benefits to the firm. They also find that production relatedness 
is more effective when aiming at profitability instead of sales. Gugler et al. (2003) analyze a 
worldwide sample of M&As with respect to profits and sales and conclude that related 
mergers perform better than conglomerate or vertical ones. In contrast, other authors 
employing R&D intensity and ROA too do not find positive effects in related acquisitions 
(Harrison et al. 1993).  
In developing our working hypothesis, we follow Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007), who conclude 
after a review of the literature on M&A and performance that there is some support for a 
  
8 
positive effect on wealth creation in business related acquisitions:  
Hypothesis 1: Business relatedness has a positive effect on acquisition performance. 
2.2. Cultural relatedness 
Managers often disregard the importance of an acquisition’s cultural impact (Chatterjee et al. 
1992). However, integration costs seem to be considerably lower when similar corporate 
cultures are combined, resulting in a positive impact on the acquisition performance (Larsson 
and Finkelstein 1999). Synergies arise from similarity in decision making processes, informal 
controls and norms that govern behavior (Datta 1991). When the ‘way the work is done’ is 
similar, misinterpretations of motives and intentions as well as interpersonal conflicts are 
reduced (Bruton et al. 1994). Cultural distance should be avoided (Larsson and Lubatkin 
2001) because the target’s culture tends to be changed according to the acquirer’s cultural 
preferences (Chatterjee 1986) with dysfunctional consequences for the integration process 
(Buono et al. 1985).  
These findings are supported by many studies which show a positive impact on firm 
performance stemming from cultural relatedness (Cloodt et al. 2006; Hagedoorn and Duysters 
2002; Morosini et al. 1998; Slangen 2006; Vermeulen and Barkema 2001). However, other 
authors find a negative effect in cultural relatedness (Buono et al. 1985; Chatterjee et al. 
1992). They explain this finding by the knowledge advancing effect of diversity. In a meta-
analysis, Stahl and Voigt (2008) show that cultural relatedness (a) in 9 M&A-studies has an 
positive impact on announcement effects measured as cumulative abnormal returns, but (b) in 
15 M&A-studies has no effects on the accounting performance of a firm.  
Based on the argument, that integration costs are lower when firms combine similar corporate 
cultures, we derive the following working hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Cultural relatedness has a positive effect on acquisition performance. 
2.3. Technological Relatedness 
The “relatedness” argument has also been discussed with respect to technology and 
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innovation. The question is whether innovations are triggered due to a better usage of similar 
technologies or enhanced employment of different knowledge bases. Synergies might arise 
due to the accumulation of similar or complementary operations (Larsson and Finkelstein 
1999). Synergies from accumulating similar operations are achieved by reduction in unit costs 
and the prevention of inefficiencies due to time consuming learning efforts. However, 
synergies, e.g. the development of new products might also be elicited by the combination of 
complementary resources.  
The ‘economies of sameness’ argument is supported by different studies (Capron and 
Mitchell 2000; Markides and Williamson 1994; Puranam and Srikanth 2007). Hagedoorn and 
Duysters (2002) find positive effects in technological similarity which they attribute to similar 
knowledge management mechanisms. However, Cassiman et al. (2005) and others (Baysinger 
and Hoskisson 1989; Cloodt et al. 2006; Hitt et al. 1996) find empirical evidence that 
complementary technologies yield economic benefits in acquisitions.  
According to the ‘economies of sameness’ argument we derive the following working 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Technological relatedness has a positive effect on acquisition performance. 
2.4. Size Relatedness 
Some authors assume that targets and buyers of similar size lead to better knowledge 
integration and show the most efficient integration processes (Ahuja and Katila 2001). In this 
case the acquirer is better prepared to recognize the value and content of the acquired 
knowledge, to assimilate it, and to apply it (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). It is easier to identify 
redundancies when both firms are of equal size (Krishnan et al. (2007). This leads to 
workforce reductions resulting in cost savings. These kinds of synergies are easily identified 
(Ficery et al. 2007). 
Other authors argue that size differences lead to higher synergies. Seth (1990) supports the 
view that a small buyer acquiring a large target increases its market power as well as 
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economies of scope and scale. In contrast, Bruton et al. (1994) argue that acquiring a 
relatively small target is associated with better acquisition performance. The larger the 
acquired company the more complex the organizational structures are. As a consequence the 
danger arises for the management to lose control (Chakrabarti 1990; Ravenscraft and Scherer 
1989). More management and financial resources have to be devoted to the target, in 
particular when the target firm is financially distressed. This is often the case with the 
acquisition of young start-up companies (Fluck and Lynch 1999). It is assumed that only a 
significantly larger buyer can provide these managerial and financial resources. 7  
Results on the profitability of size relatedness are mixed. Some authors (Chatterjee and 
Wernerfelt 1991; Finkelstein and Haleblian 2002; Heeley et al. 2006; Kumar 1985; Papadakis 
2005; Puranam and Srikanth 2007; Ravenscraft and Scherer 1989; Slangen 2006) find 
evidence for increased profitability when both buyer and target are of similar size.  
According to Scanlon et al. (1989) small firms acquiring related firms tend to outperform 
large firms that acquire firms in unrelated businesses.8 The study of Seth (1990) shows a 
similar result. However, he demonstrates that synergistic gains are greater for large firms 
acquiring in related businesses as opposed to small firms executing related acquisitions. 
Kusewitt (1985), Bruton, Oviatt and White (1994) and others (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989; 
Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002; Hitt et al. 1991; Moeller et al. 2004; Vermeulen and Barkema 
2001) find that size relatedness is only slightly connected to performance. Fuller et al. (2002) 
even find larger cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) the smaller the target.9  
 According to the ‘integration’ argument, we derive the following working hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Size relatedness has a positive effect on acquisition performance. 
                                                 
7
 As single entities these projects would not exist. Fluck & Lynch (1999) consider this approach consistent with 
diversified firms suffering from a conglomerate discount in financial markets and thus displaying a lower value 
than focused firms. Nonetheless, in this case, the combined entity has a higher value as compared to stand alone 
firms. 
8
 In Scanlon et al. (1989) abnormal returns for small-related acquisitions are positive but not significant whereas 
for large acquisitions CARs are significantly negative. 
9
 However, this result only holds concerning public targets. 
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3. Research method 
3.1. Applied Method, former Meta-Analyses and methodical (Dis)Advantages 
Our research is based on a meta-analysis of previous empirical studies that examined the 
relationship between relatedness of the target firm and the acquiring firm on subsequent 
acquisition performance. In contrast to other meta-analyses we compare the effects of four 
different relatedness dimensions on acquisition performance and we understand acquisition 
performance as a multi-dimensional construct which includes among others knowledge 
indicators. The most comprehensive meta-analytic review of M&A by King et al. (2004) 
solely analyses the effects of business relatedness on abnormal returns and accounting 
measures. Larsson and Lubatkin (2001) as well as Stahl and Voigt (2008) concentrate on 
cultural effects and do not consider any kind of knowledge indicators or longevity measure.  
The advantages of meta-analysis are (1) quantification of surveys and results, (2) 
conceivability by persons not involved in science, (3) replicability and impartiality. 
Disadvantages are (1) comparability of the surveys, (2) integration of surveys of differing 
quality, (3) „publication bias“ in favor of published, significant results (4) „non-independent 
effects“ in case a survey documents several correlations (Eisend 2004). Our study minimizes 
two disadvantages: Firstly, non-independent effects are reduced by applying subgroup-
analyses. Secondly, comparability of different surveys is enhanced by distinguishing between 
different performance-measurements and by applying moderator analyses.  
3.2. Sample and Sample Bias 
We collected the study sample by combining three research steps: (1) We conducted 
computerized database searches in the Web of science using the key words “mergers”, 
“acquisition”, “M&A”, “related/ unrelated “, “relatedness”. (2) We screened the cited and 
citing literature of prior meta-analysis on mergers and acquisitions (Datta et al. 1992; King et 
al. 2004; Stahl and Voigt 2008). (3) We screened the cited and citing literature of articles that 
examined the relationship between relatedness and acquisition performance (e.g. Lubatkin 
  
12 
1987; Lubatkin and Srinivasan 1997). We stopped the screening procedure only when no new 
studies were found.  
Our final sample has four major biases which should be considered when interpreting the 
results. Firstly, our sample has a strong „publication bias“ in favor of results published in 
refereed journals and in English language. Books, book sections, working papers and non-
refereed conference proceedings were excluded. Secondly, only studies that were available 
were included, i.e. journals or periods of journals not licensed by the university were 
excluded. Finally we stopped our search procedure after not finding additional studies 
matching our criteria. 
The final sample consists of 67 empirical studies (n= 23,391 M&As).10. The studies document 
479 statistic correlations between synergy variables respectively the size of the acquiring 
company and acquisition performance. Our sample size is comparable with the samples of 
prior meta-analyses on M&As. The sample of Datta et al. (1992) consists of 41 studies and 
409 correlations. The recent sample of Stahl and Voigt (2008) consists of 46 studies and a 
combined sample size of 10,710 M&As. The analysis of King et al. (2004) takes into account 
93 studies, 852 correlations and a combined sample size of 15,305 M&As.11 Concerning the 
effects of relatedness on acquisition performance, King et al. (2004) include 41 studies and a 
combined sample size of 6,581 M&As.  
The included studies cover a wide variety of industries: global chemicals, high-tech sector, 
IT- and pharmaceutical sector, semiconductor industry, industrial manufacturing sector, non-
financial firms or a random sample of all industries. Concerning sample size the smallest 
sample includes 25 M&As , the largest 6,428 M&As. The median sample size across all 
studies is 479. The time period covered ranges from 1948 up to 2002. More descriptive 
information on the study sample is listed in table 1. 
                                                 
10
 Included studies are listed in the reference section. Two studies are counted as four studies because both 
studies use two independent samples. 
11
 In their study the authors talk about a combined sample size of 206,910 M&As. This number is obtained by 
adding up sample sizes of different correlations from one study. 
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------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
3.3. Operationalization of Relatedness 
We coded the studies in terms of cultural, business, technological, and size relatedness 
between target and buyer. A wide range of indicators was employed. Table A1 in the 
appendix gives a detailed overview. For the statistical analysis we recoded all distance 
measurements as relatedness measurements by inverting the correlation sign. Recoding was 
especially important with respect to cultural relatedness and to some measures of size 
relatedness.  
Business Relatedness is commonly assessed in four different ways: (1) objective measures of  
relatedness by computing a diversification index based on the 2 and 4-digit SIC code of the 
companies, (2) refinement of these measures by including an entropy index and a Herfindahl-
Index according to Palepu (1985), (3) qualitative approaches for classification as proposed by 
Rumelt (1974), Porter (1985) and Bettis and Hall (1982), or (4) subjective measures of 
relatedness based on surveys or expert judgments. 
Cultural Relatedness is commonly assessed in three different ways: (1) a national cultural 
distance index by applying the approach of Kogut and Singh (1988) and by using the 
differences in country scores of Hofstede’s (1980) four dimensions of national culture, i.e. 
uncertainty avoidance, power distance, individualism and masculinity, (2) bivariate variables 
distinguishing between domestic and foreign expansions, (3) subjective measures of cultural 
differences based on survey questions. 
Technological Relatedness is commonly assessed in three different ways: (1) objective 
measures of relatedness by computing a diversification index based on the IPC-classes of the 
companies patent stocks following Hall et al. (2001), (2) numbers of patents that appeared in 
both the acquired and the acquiring firm’s knowledge base, (3) subjective measures of a 
common technology base based on surveys or expert judgments. 
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Size Relatedness was coded in two ways: (1) a ratio of target to acquirer size by using assets, 
revenues, sales, number of employees, (2) surveys or expert judgments by employing scales 
ranging from “the acquiring firm is smaller in size" to " the acquiring firm is more than ten 
times the size of the acquired firm." All measurements of size relatedness were recoded in the 
following way: Larger scores indicate a larger relative size of the target.  
Absolute size of the acquirer was included as an additional variable. Larger acquirers might 
have greater power to absorb a new unit and thus are more able to realize potential synergies 
(Seth 1990). We included the well-known size effect as a control variable in order to visualize 
the relative effects of relatedness on acquisition performance and for reasons of interpretation. 
Most studies measured size by using assets, sales or number of employees of the acquiring 
company.  
3.4. Operationalization of Acquisition Performance 
The dependent variable “acquisition performance” can be assessed against a wide variety of 
benchmarks. For example an acquisition can provide access to new markets or to new 
technologies while being unprofitable from a financial viewpoint at the same time. In contrast, 
an acquisition that provides tax benefits and other financial values does not necessarily lead to 
new technologies or access to new markets. Because of this multi-dimensionality we use 
several performance constructs.  
The success of acquisitions normally is assessed using the event study method. Event studies 
analyze the market’s reaction around the merger announcement date and calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns (see e.g. Brown and Warner 1980; MacKinlay 1997). The drawback of this 
method is its reliance on the semi-strong form of the market efficiency hypothesis which is 
disputable. Another drawback is its strong focus on financial investors. Financial investors are 
interested in short-term monetary gains (King et al. 2004; Schoenberg 2006). However, these 
gains might not be sustainable and can represent stock market anomalies or stock market 
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reactions with respect to the chosen accounting method (Robinson and Shane 1990)12. For 
example, some private equity companies „(…) simply take a business private, load it with 
debt, strip its assets, then sell it a few months later for multiples of the purchase price (…)“ 
(Kiechel 2007: 18). For this reason the market’s reaction around the merger announcement 
date might be a good measurement of M&A-gains of financial investors but not necessarily of 
strategic investors and blockholders.  
Long term sustainable competitive advantage in M&A is achieved via operating efficiency, 
new product developments and patenting activities, basic R&D, knowledge transfer and 
combination and the longevity of executed M&A. Therefore, the long term success of 
acquisitions can be assessed via these indicators.  
We classified the studies in terms of five different performance types. As with relatedness the 
studies employ a wide range of indicators in order to measure one specific performance type. 
Table A2 in the appendix gives a detailed overview.  
Objective standard performance was measured by distinguishing between the shareholder 
value of the M&A and the accounting performance of the combined company. 
Shareholder Value is commonly measured via abnormal returns (CAR, MCAR), wealth 
effects, performance in market share, earning per share growth, stock returns, or percent 
change in market value.  
Accounting Performance was measured as (1) the absolute EBITDA, ROA, ROE, ROS, 
sales of the combined company as well as the growth of these indicators, or (2) the growth in 
sales etc. as indicated by respondents. 
Skill transfer & combination captures acquisition performance with respect to innovation 
and knowledge as the basis of sustainable competitive advantage. The included studies 
employ the following measures: (1) leverage of innovation capabilities and knowledge based 
                                                 
12
 So called “purchase” accountings tend to perform better, but “pooling” accounting has been abolished in the 
meantime (Lindenberg and Ross 1999). Andrade (1999) finds that the accounting method is used by acquirers to 
improve earnings dilution effects.  
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on patent authorship data or on patent citations, (2) changes in R&D intensity, new product 
intensity, number of patents, patent intensity growth, (3) subjective measures of skill and 
resource transfer, of new product development, of innovation, technology or R&D field 
growth based on surveys or expert judgments. 
Overall acquisition performance measures the impact of M&A on combined performance. 
Usually subjective measurements are employed: (1) a combination of multiple survey 
questions capturing the extent of synergy realization through realized benefits from 
purchasing, production, marketing, market power, administration, vertical economies, new 
market access, cross-selling, know-how transfer, knowledge creation etc., (2) expert 
evaluations of executives and analysts regarding the financial and strategic benefits from the 
acquisition. 
Longevity (1) measures whether the acquired company was divested by the parent company 
or (2) captures the number of years a venture persisted. These measurements were recoded in 
the following way: Larger scores indicate longer survivals.  
3.5. Operationalization of other Performance Classifications 
In order to check for alternative performance effects, we recoded the dependent variable 
“acquisition performance” to capture time effects and performance effects. 
To capture time effects, effects that might trigger acquisition performance (King et al. 2004; 
Stahl and Voigt 2008) we recoded the dependent variable acquisition performance in the 
following way: (1) market reactions around 2 days before and 2 days after the merger 
announcement date, (2) market reactions around 10 days before and 10 days after the merger 
announcement date, (3) market reactions around 100 days before and 100 days after the 
merger announcement date, (4) strategic performance measures, e.g. accounting measures or 
skill transfer & combination, observed within (or even before) the acquisition year, (5) 
strategic performance measures observed after the acquisition year. 
To capture performance effects that might influence acquisition performance  we coded the 
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studies in terms of (1) performance measured for acquirers/ combined firms and (2) 
performance measured for target firms (Stahl and Voigt 2008). 
3.6. Operationalization of Moderator Variables 
The inconsistent results in M&A research might be partially a consequence of contingencies 
which moderate the effect of relatedness on acquisition performance. Moderator variables 
firstly help to substantiate main results. Secondly, they help to explain insignificant or small 
effects. Positive effects may be obtained for one characteristic of the moderator while 
negative effects may be obtained for a different characteristic. In order to check for such 
effects, we coded four moderator variables independent of the introduced measurements 
which might moderate acquisition performance. 
Knowledge-intensity of the industry (Cloodt et al. 2006): We classified the studies as 
follows: (1) studies solely observing M&As in the High-Tech industry, (2) studies observing 
random samples, i.e. M&As in High- and Low-Tech firms, (3) studies solely observing 
M&As in the Low-Tech industry. 
Acquisition size: Acquisitions of large targets are often expected to be more successful in 
related acquisitions (Seth 1990). We arrange the studies as follows: (1) studies solely 
observing large M&As, (2) studies observing random samples, i.e. large and small M&As, (3) 
studies solely observing small M&As. 
Region (Hofstede 2001): The studies were distinguished between (1) studies observing global 
M&As, (2) studies solely observing US M&As, (3) studies solely observing Europe M&As. 
There was no study for M&As in Asia. 
3.7. Coding and Inter-rater Agreement 
Depending on the available information we collected data on (1) correlation values and 
overall sample size, (2) mean values, standard deviations and group sample size, or (3) mean 
values, t-values and group sample size. 26 studies of the 67 studies were coded by two 
independent raters (the second author and a student about to obtain his diploma). The 
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interrater reliability was measured by the percentage agreement (Orwin 1994). This 
percentage amounts to 93% suggesting that the coding process produced reliable data. The 
remaining studies where coded by the second author.13 
3.8. Method 
We used the software “Comprehensive Meta Analysis” (Borenstein et al. 2007). It transforms 
different statistical information into Fisher’s Z using the approach of Hunter and Schmidt 
(2004). We checked for publication outliers by plotting a study’s effect size against its 
standard error. The studies were approximate symmetrically distributed demonstrating the 
absence of distorting publication bias. In contrast to some meta-analyses we did not correct 
the unreliability of studies based on self-reported measures (King et al. 2004), even though we 
checked for systematic errors. The standardised mean effects of self-report and of objective 
measures do not vary significantly (p=0.62).  
To ensure an acceptable level of independence among studies with multiple subgroups, effect 
sizes were averaged when a study provided multiple indicators of the same variable, e.g. 
different indicators for business relatedness (King et al. 2004). When a study documents 
multiple subgroups, we determined a total effect d. For correlations r this effect is calculated 
as follows: 
(1) 
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Finally, we calculate an average effect Cohen's d  for the total sample and for each kind of 
outcome measurement respectively. The effect is corrected for sampling errors. We are using 
fixed-effect-models, i.e. the correlations are weighted by the sample size of a study. The 
fixed-effect approach builds on the assumption of an overall population parameter, whereby 
the effects of a single study randomly differ from the error in the overall sample. The total 
effect is calculated from the study-specific weights w, as follows: 
                                                 
13
 In some cases variables had to be coded in opposite directions in order to measure the effect of relatedness 
(and not of distance) on performance (and not on without-performance). 
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The results were checked for their internal homogeneity. A significant Q-value is evidence of 
variability of study-level effect sizes and thus indicates the existence of moderator variables. 
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We tested for significant moderator effects by comparing the mean effect sizes between the 
subgroups by means of a critical ratio tests (Borenstein et al. 2007). We performed subgroup 
analyses independent of the number of included studies. The convention is that each subgroup 
should contain a minimum of three studies (Dalton et al. 2003). For this reason we only 
interpret subgroup effects which are calculated on this minimum.  
4. Results 
Firstly, we show the overall effects of each relatedness dimension on acquisition performance. 
Secondly, we illustrate how each relatedness dimension contributes to different performance 
measures. Thirdly, we demonstrate how each relatedness dimension contributes to acquisition 
performance depending on contingencies. The results are discussed in section 5. 
4.1. Relatedness and overall performance  
Table 2. Overall relatedness, i.e. the composite index of all relatedness types, is not 
correlated with overall acquisition performance (-.001). Furthermore, business relatedness 
(.018*) and technology relatedness (.070**) are positively linked with overall acquisition 
performance, while cultural relatedness (-.132***) and size relatedness (-.070**) are 
negatively linked with overall acquisition performance. The findings substantiate hypotheses 
H1 and H3 and reject hypotheses H2 and H4. Table 2 shows that the absolute size of the 
acquiring company is negatively linked with overall acquisition performance (-.035***) 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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4.2. Relatedness and performance measures 
Table 3 documents how relatedness impacts different performance types. Overall relatedness 
has no impact on the shareholder value (-.010), the transfer of skills and resources (-.005), and 
on overall acquisition performance (-.018), whereas it positively influences accounting 
performance (.033*) and negatively longevity (-.219***; 2 studies).  
Distinguishing relatedness types we find that business relatedness enhances the transfer and 
combination of skills and resources (.123***) and overall acquisition performance (.163***) 
while having no influence on shareholder value and accounting performance. Cultural 
relatedness has strong negative effects on shareholder value (-.307***) and overall 
acquisition performance (-.149***). The performance effects of technology relatedness are 
mixed: Technology relatedness increases the shareholder value (.231***) and the accounting 
performance (.295**), while decreasing the transfer and combination of skills and resources (-
.318***). Size relatedness has negative effects on accounting performance (-.250***), 
indicating that larger acquirers relative to the target are in some respects more successful. 
These findings match the findings about absolute size: Acquirers with a large absolute size 
earn higher accounting gains (.231***)) than acquirers with a small absolute size. However, 
acquirers with a large absolute size display lower shareholder value (-.516***) and have a 
lower skill transfer and combination measure (-.091***) than acquirers with a small absolute 
size. The effects of relatedness on the longevity of M&As are not dicussed because the 
sample mainly consists of 1 study.   
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Table 6 documents how relatedness impacts performance dependent on time. In the short-run 
overall relatedness has positive effects as indicated by the increase of shareholder value in the 
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5-day-window14 around the announcement date (0.67***). However, studies using larger time 
windows discover the opposite (-.031†/ -.137***). Studies relying on other performance 
measurements than stock markets find no effects of relatedness on the performance in the 
acquisition year (.020) and on post-acquisition performance (.007). 
On the level of each relatedness variable we find that business relatedness has only short-term 
performance effects as indicated by the increase of shareholder value in the 5-day-window 
(.067***) and the increase of the strategic performance within the acquisition year (.068***). 
In the long run business relatedness decreases performance as indicated by its negative effects 
on shareholder value in the 201-day-window15 around the announcement (-.170***) or it has 
no effects as indicated by its influence on post-acquisition performance (.012). Cultural 
relatedness has stronger negative effects in the short (-.374***/ -.083*) than in the long run (-
.158/ .060†), while technology relatedness has positive effects in the long run (.194**). The 
negative effects of size relatedness are more pronounced in the short (-.162***) than in the 
long run (-.081**). Finally, compared with smaller acquirers larger acquirers perform poorer 
within the acquisition year (-.042***), but show no performance difference in the post-
acquisition period (.049).  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------ 
  
Table 5 documents how relatedness impacts the performance of targets and buyers. Overall 
relatedness is negatively associated with the performance of targets (-.090***) and has no 
impact on the performance of the acquiring respectively the combined company (.006).  
Distinguishing relatedness types we find that cultural relatedness (-.474*** vs. -.006*) is 
linked with a poorer performance of targets supporting the former result.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
                                                 
14
 The 5-window covers days -2 to +2 relative to the transaction announcement date as mentioned in section 3.5.  
15
 The 201-day-window covers days -100 to +100 relative to the transaction announcement date as mentioned in 
section 3.5. 
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4.3. Relatedness dependent on contingencies 
Table 6 shows how relatedness depends on the knowledge intensity of the industry. Striking 
is the low number of M&A-studies conducted within the Low-Tech-industry even though 
acquisitions are very common, e.g. the actual tendency of building contractors acquiring 
facility service providers. Because of the small sample size we interpret only the results of the 
High-Tech industry and the mixed sample, i.e. studies sampling High- and Low-Tech firms. 
The results indicate that relatedness overall has no effects on acquisition performance both in 
the mixed sample (-.005) and in High-Tech-industries (.030).  
When relatedness types are distinguished, the results show that business relatedness increases 
the performance in the High-Tech industry (.213***) but has no effects in the mixed sample 
(.006), while size relatedness has no effect in the High-Tech industry but decrease 
performance in the mixed sample (-.070*). Finally, technology relatedness leads to 
performance declines in the High-Tech industry (-.211***) while increasing performance in 
the mixed sample (.152***). The absolute size of the acquirer involves higher performance 
declines in the High-Tech sector (-.084**) compared to the mixed sample (-.027**).  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------ 
Table 7 shows how relatedness depends on acquisition size. Most studies analyze samples of 
large but not of small M&A; we therefore interpret the results of large and mixed samples 
only. The analysis demonstrates that overall relatedness has no effects in large M&As (-.011)
and in mixed samples (.006).  
A more detailed analysis shows that business relatedness decreases the performance in large 
M&A (-.030*) while increasing the performance in the mixed sample (.062***). Cultural 
relatedness has smaller negative effects in large M&A (-.097*) compared with the mixed 
sample (-.167***). Technology relatedness shows positive performance effects in large M&A 
(.144***) while showing negative effects in the mixed sample (-.163***). Finally, the 
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absolute size of the acquirer has more pronounced negative performance effects in samples 
looking at large M&As (-.095**) than in mixed samples (-.020†).  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------ 
Table 8 demonstrates how relatedness depends on regions. The findings indicate that overall 
relatedness has a neutral effect in samples referring to global or US acquirers (.005/.003) 
while it seems to decrease the performance in samples referring to European acquirers (-
.042†).  
When relatedness types are distinguished, the results show that business relatedness has 
significant and positive effects for global-acquirers only (.165***). Cultural relatedness 
decreases the performance independent of region (-.123**/-.156**/-.142**). The results 
reveal that technology relatedness significantly increases the performance of US-acquirers 
(.164***). Size relatedness shows significant and negative effects by US-acquirers (-
.125***). This finding is substantiated by the effects of absolute size: While size pays off for 
US-acquirers (.073*), it involves losses for global- as well as for European-acquirers (-
.035***/-.676***).  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------ 
5. Discussion 
Table 9 summarizes the study’s findings. The overall message is that synergies indeed exist in 
mergers and acquisitions. However, these synergies can arise due to either similarities or due 
to dissimilarities between the acquirer and the target. The optimal amount of relatedness or of 
differences strongly depends on (a) the interests of major investors as indicated by the 
performance measurements of financial (e.g. with respect to shareholder value) and strategic 
investors (e.g. with respect to skill transfer & combination; Table 3, section 4.2), (b) the 
organizational goals as indicated by time effects (Table 4, section 4.2), (c) other interests 
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groups (Table 5, section 4.2), e.g. the employees of the target, as indicated by target and buyer 
effects, (d) industry characteristics as indicated by the knowledge-intensity of firms (Table 6, 
section 4.3), (e) firm size (Table 7, section 4.3), (f) institutional- and country-specific 
characteristics as indicated by region (Table 8, section 4.3).  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The results allow more precise predictions according to three topics: 
Firstly, we concentrate on overall performance and on the contribution each single relatedness 
construct makes to it. Secondly, we consider different investor types, i.e. strategic investors 
vs. financial investors, different time horizons of performance measures, and the performance 
of the target or of the acquirer respectively. Thirdly, we turn to the moderators. 
Ad 1: The overall effect of relatedness on performance is negligible. It is also possible that 
synergies exist but that their effect is too small to pay-off a (high) acquisition premium. 
Nonetheless, the single dimensions of relatedness have different impacts. Moderate positive 
effects on overall performance stem from both business and technological relatedness. In 
contrast, cultural relatedness displays a strong negative effect on overall performance, and 
size relatedness exhibits a moderate negative effect. To summarize the first topic:   
- Synergies due to relatedness arise in M&A when firms work in similar businesses and build 
on similar technologies but at the same time have dissimilar cultures.  
- The acquirer should be larger than the target.  
- Synergies will decrease if the absolute size of a buyer is too large. 
These findings are supported by prior research: The meta-analysis of Stahl et al. (2008) 
supports the finding that cultural distance might be an overall “success factor” by showing 
that cultural relatedness reduces socio-cultural integration efforts. Principal-agent theory 
further supports the negative influence of absolute size on acquisition success by reasoning 
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that especially managers of big companies are more entrenched and thus find ways to bypass 
the interests of shareholders (Tosi et al. 2000). The absolute size finding is also in line with 
the firm size distribution, which is significantly skewed to the right with a large peak for the 
smallest size class (Laincz and Rodrigues 2005), indicating that a healthy growth of big firms 
is naturally limited.  
Ad 2: Different investor types apply different performance criteria.  We define financial 
investors as being mainly interested in shareholder value whereas strategic investors are 
mainly interested in a composite of skill transfer & combination, longevity, accounting 
performance and overall performance. Table 9 classifies different investor types and their 
benefits from the single relatedness dimensions according to our results. Financial investors 
profit from technological relatedness and small M&A (i.e. the acquirer should be smaller in 
absolute size). Strategic investors benefit from business relatedness, from size differences (i.e. 
the acquirer should be larger than the target) and from large M&A (i.e. the acquirer should be 
larger in absolute size). Both financial and strategic investors benefit if both companies have 
dissimilar cultures.  
Furthermore, synergies differ with respect to short and long run performance measures. Short 
run measures comprise the short time frames (-2,2 and -10,10) as well as the (pre-) acquisition 
performance measures (see table 5) and thus are more interesting for financial investors. Long 
run measures comprise the long time frame (-100,100) and the post-acquisition performance 
measures and thus are more interesting for strategic investors (see table 5). A financial 
theorist would argue that the short time frames also reflect long run shareholder expectations. 
However, even in financial studies there is a distinction between short run and long run event 
studies: “While the exact definition of “long horizon” is arbitrary, it generally applies to event 
windows of 1 year or more.” (Kothari and Warner 2004: 7). Thus, an exact allocation of 
benefits to financial or strategic investors based on time frames cannot be made with 
certainty.   
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In the short run synergies arise from business relatedness. In the long run synergies arise from 
technological relatedness. Synergies in M&A can be expected both in the short and in the 
long run if the cultures between both companies differ and if the acquirer is larger in size than 
the target.  
Synergies also differ with respect to the acquirer’s and target’s performance. Whereas 
acquirers and their investors benefit from synergies due to business relatedness, the target 
does not benefit. Only in the case of cultural distance are the investors of both groups able to 
increase their performance.  
Ad 3. Synergy effects by relatedness are moderated by knowledge intensity, absolute size and 
region. They are summarized in Table 11.  
The first moderator is the knowledge intensity of the industry. Synergies arise 
• in M&A in the High-tech sector if both companies work in similar businesses but build 
on complementary technologies. The acquirer should be not too large in absolute size. 
• in M&A in the Medium-tech sector if both companies have dissimilar cultures but build 
on similar technologies. The acquirer should be overall not too large in absolute size but 
larger than the target. 
As a result in knowledge intensive sectors similarity in valuable knowledge stocks boosts 
problems (e.g. technology relatedness) while similarity in surrounding factors (e.g. business 
models) reduces problems. The opposite is true for sectors which build less on knowledge. 
The second moderator considers the absolute size of acquisitions. Synergies arise  
• in large M&A if both companies work in dissimilar businesses, have dissimilar cultures, 
but build on similar technologies. The acquirer should be larger than the target.  
• in medium M&A if both companies work in similar businesses but have dissimilar 
cultures and build on complementary technologies. The acquirer should be larger than 
the target. 
•  in large as well as in medium M&A the synergies will decrease if the absolute size of a 
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buyer is very large.  
These results show that technology relatedness helps to overcome some of the problems in 
large M&A. This finding is in line with the result that absolute firm size hinders the transfer 
and combination of knowledge in M&A. In contrast, small firms profit from technological 
complementarities. 
The third moderator is the region according to the sample of M&A used in each study. 
Synergies arise 
• in global M&A if both companies work in similar businesses but have dissimilar 
cultures. However, if the absolute size of a buyer is very large the synergies will 
decrease  
• in US M&A if both companies have dissimilar cultures but build on similar 
technologies. The buyer company should be larger than the target. Buyers with a larger 
absolute size earn higher synergies. 
• in European M&A if both companies have dissimilar cultures. The buyer company 
should be larger than the target. However, if the absolute size of a buyer is very large the 
synergies will decrease.  
These results substantiate the argument that the effects of relatedness on acquisition 
performance are dependent on the region. As indicated by the opposite results of firm size on 
acquisition success in US and European M&A country-specific institutions are important. 
Many European companies are characterized by strong labor unions, co-determination and 
protections against dismissals16. These institutions affect the market for corporate control by 
complicating M&A of large firms. The findings imply that research results, especially results 
published in American journals, should be transferred to Europe with care. 
To summarize the results of all three topics, our findings indicate that synergies depend on a 
                                                 
16
 Of the former EU-25 11 countries have strong co-determination laws: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden. In the UK, Greece, 
France, Italy and Spain such labor laws are absent. In the UK the influence of labor unions is dependent on the 
business segment. 
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wide variety of factors such as industry-, country, law- and investor-characteristics and are 
considerably low. The relatedness hypothesis should also be discussed by including different 
interest groups, e.g. financial and strategic investors and contingencies like knowledge 
intensity of the industry or country specific effects. As a consequence synergies due to 
relatedness are not able to explain the huge acquisition activities in the last decades to a 
sufficient extent. Other explanations have to be found.  
6. Conclusion 
6.1. Contributions 
Our study first highlights the ineffectiveness of synergies due to relatedness on the overall 
performance level. The analysis clearly shows that in sum such synergies are negligible.  
Second we analyze the effect of four different dimensions of relatedness, i.e. business, 
cultural, technological and size relatedness, on different aspects of acquisition performance. 
Moderate positive effects on overall acquisition performance stem from business and 
technological relatedness. Cultural relatedness displays a strong negative effect on overall 
performance, and size relatedness exhibits a moderate negative effect. Furthermore, since 
different investor types apply different performance criteria, an acquisition should satisfy both 
groups. However, synergies due to relatedness only arise for different investor types in the 
case of cultural distance.  
Thirdly, our study points at the complexity of synergy assessments. We have shown that 
synergies are dependent on a variety of additional factors (such as country characteristics or 
time effects).  
Fourthly, we applied multi-faceted performance criteria. We not only distinguish between 
accounting and market based measures but introduce knowledge indicators, e.g. skill transfer 
& combination, longevity, as measures of success. Knowledge indicators capture acquisition 
performance with respect to innovation and knowledge. Thus, they can be interpreted as the 
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grounds on which sustainable competitive advantage is built as opposed to mere financial 
indicators. 
Fifthly we provide evidence that the absolute size of an acquirer is extremely important and 
cannot be neglected. Our results suggests that smaller acquirers are more likely to profit from 
M&A underlining that growth of firms is naturally limited.  
As a consequence for practice, the board of directors as well as shareholders are well advised 
not to rely on promises of synergies due to relatedness on an overall level given by their 
executives. These results are in line with analyses of e.g. Kürsten (2008) and others (see e.g. 
King et al. 2004) who provide analytical and empirical evidence that shareholders are best 
advised to doubt promises of synergies made by executives when acquiring other firms.  
 
6.2. Limitations  
Our study has a number of limitations as mentioned in sections 3.1 and 3.2. Firstly, our 
sample has a strong „publication bias“ in favor of results published in referreed journals and 
in English language. Secondly, only studies that were electronically available were included.  
We tried to minimize some disadvantages through properly applied methods of analysis and 
by including control and moderator variables. Firstly, non-independent effects are reduced by 
applying subgroup-analyses. Secondly, comparability of different surveys is enhanced by 
distinguishing between different performance-measurements and by applying moderator 
analyses.   
6.3. Further Research  
Further research could go different avenues. The first could intensify the research on different 
contingency factors like country differences, investor characteristics or sector affiliations. 
Thus, other methods than meta-analysis could be applied. E.g. Bruner (2005) presents a series 
of detailed case studies in his analysis of factors contributing to M&A failures. 
A second avenue could start with the finding that synergies are overestimated. Two 
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explanations for the huge amount of M&A activities have already been proposed. The first 
explanation is the empire building of managers (Sudarsanam 1995). According to this view 
managers pursue M&As because of self-interested goals like high salaries, prestige or power 
which are facilitated by takeover (Morck et al. 1990). As second proposition is the hubris 
hypothesis (Roll 1986). According to this hypothesis managers systematically overestimate 
their abilities. They are convinced that they have the ability to identify hidden synergies and 
pick promising targets that others cannot (Doukas and Petmezas 2007: 537). To date only few 
measures for managerial hubris exist, e.g. in terms of media praise for the CEO (see e. g. 
Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007; Hayward and Hambrick 1997; Malmendier and Tate 2005; 
Malmendier and Tate 2008) . A combination of these two research avenues promises to 
explain the extent of M&A activities.  
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Figures 
Figure 1. M&A waves in the last decades  
 
Source: adopted from Müller-Stewens & Lechner (Chatterjee 1986) 
 
Figure 2. Analyzed Impact of Relatedness on M&A Performance 
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the 67 M&A studies included in the Meta-Analysis 
Dependent Variable      
Effect of relatedness on 
performance 
Business 
relatedness 
Culture 
relatedness 
Technology 
relatedness 
Size 
relatedness 
Absolute size 
Acquirer 
Number of studies (k) 46 21 12 19 13 
Number of subgroups 254 77 58 48 42 
Number of M&As in k 12,268 4,372 2,692 2,526 10,461 
Moderator variables:      
Performance type Shareholder 
value 
Accounting 
performance 
Skill transfer 
& 
combination 
Overall 
acquisition 
performance 
Longevity 
Studies (k) 29 29 20 8 2 
Subgroups 133 124 44 27 124 
Time effect (-2;2)  
Days 
after/before  
announcement 
(-10;10)  
Days 
after/before  
announcement 
(-100;100)  
Days 
after/before  
announcement 
(Pre-) 
Acquisition  
performance 
Post-
Acquisition  
performance 
Studies (k) 5 11 9 30 31 
Subgroups 16 39 53 133 238 
Performance effect Performance  
target firms 
Performance 
acquiring 
firms 
   
Studies (k) 12 61    
Subgroups 66 413    
Knowledge-intensity of 
the industry 
High-Tech 
industry 
High- & Low-
Tech industry 
Low-Tech 
industry 
  
Studies (k) 10 55 2   
Subgroups 68 405 6   
Acquisition Size Large  
M&As 
Large & small 
M&As 
Small M&As   
Studies (k) 39 25 3   
Subgroups 265 200 14   
Region Global M&As US M&As Europe 
M&As 
  
Studies (k) 15 41 11   
Subgroups 87 301 91   
 
 
 
Table 2. Effect of relatedness on overall performance (Cohen's d) 
Line Performance 
type 
Business 
relatedness 
Culture 
relatedness 
Technology 
relatedness 
Size 
relatedness 
Relatedness 
Overall 
Absolute 
Size Acqui. 
1 Overall .018* 
k=46 
Subgr.(k)=254 
N(k)=12,268 
Median 
N(k)=157 
Q=5,440*** 
-.132*** 
k=21 
Subgr.(k)=77 
N(k)=4,372 
Median 
N(k)=102 
Q=559*** 
.070** 
k=12 
Subgr.(k)=58 
N(k)=2,692 
 Median 
N(k)=122 
Q=335*** 
-.070** 
k=19 
Subgr.(k)=48 
N(k)=2,526 
Median 
N(k)=102 
Q=136*** 
-.001  
k=67 
Subgr.(k)=437 
N(k)=23,391 
Median 
N(k)=143 
Q=6,526*** 
-.035*** 
k=13 
Subgr.(k)=42 
N(k)=10,461 
Median 
N(k)=250 
Q=3,541*** 
Legend: †p < 0.10/ *p < 0.05/ **p < 0.01/ ***p < 0.001  
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Table 3. Effect of relatedness on performance dependent on performance type (Cohen's d) 
Line Performance 
type 
Business 
relatedness 
Culture 
relatedness 
Technology 
relatedness 
Size 
relatedness 
Relatedness 
Overall 
Absolute 
Size Acqui. 
1 Shareholder 
value 
-.003 
k=18 
Subgr.(k)=103 
Q=3,074*** 
-.307*** 
k=7 
Subgr.(k)=11 
Q=255*** 
.231*** 
k=4 
Subgr.(k)=15 
Q=23† 
.041 
k=7 
Subgr.(k)=8 
Q=13† 
-.010 
k=29 
Subgr.(k)=132 
Q=3,432*** 
-.516*** 
k=1 
Subgr.(k)=1 
Q=0 
2 Accounting  
performance 
.017 
k=24 
Subgr.(k)=108 
Q=2,065*** 
-.049 
k=6 
Subgr.(k)=11 
Q=34*** 
.295** 
k=5 
Subgr.(k)=15 
Q=24** 
-.250*** 
k=6 
Subgr.(k)=9 
Q=44*** 
.033* 
k=29 
Subgr.(k)=143 
Q=2,244*** 
.231*** 
k=7 
Subgr.(k)=8 
Q=855*** 
3 Skill transfer  
& 
combination 
.123*** 
k=13 
Subgr.(k)=28 
Q=234*** 
-.010 
k=7 
Subgr.(k)=24 
Q=70*** 
-.318*** 
k=7 
Subgr.(k)=33 
Q=80*** 
-.023 
k=6 
Subgr.(k)=19 
Q=9 
-.005 
k=20 
Subgr.(k)=104 
Q=580*** 
-.091*** 
k=7 
Subgr.(k)=20 
Q=1,967*** 
4 Overall 
acquisition  
performance 
.163*** 
k=5 
Subgr.(k)=9 
Q=36*** 
-.149** 
k=5 
Subgr.(k)=29 
Q=36*** 
/ .071 
k=5 
Subgr.(k)=6 
Q=9 
-.018 
k=8 
Subgr.(k)=44 
Q=1,132*** 
/ 
5 Longevity -.084 
k=1 
Subgr.(k)=6 
Q=7 
-.314*** 
k=1 
Subgr.(k)=2 
Q=0 
/ -.166* 
k=1 
Subgr.(k)=6 
Q=13** 
-.165*** 
k=2 
Subgr.(k)=14 
Q=23* 
.219*** 
k=2 
Subgr.(k)=13 
Q=82*** 
Legend: †p < 0.10/ *p < 0.05/ **p < 0.01/ ***p < 0.001  
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Table 4. Effect of relatedness on performance dependent on time effects (Cohen's d) 
Line Time effects Business 
relatedness 
Culture 
relatedness 
Technology 
relatedness 
Size 
relatedness 
Relatedness 
Overall 
Absolute 
Size Acqui. 
1 (-2;2) Days 
after/before  
announcement 
.067***  
k=5 
Subgr.(k)=16 
Q=408*** 
/ 
 
/ / .067***  
k=5 
Subgr.(k)=16 
Q=408*** 
/ 
2 (-10;10) Days 
after/before  
announcement 
.004 
k=7 
Subgr.(k)=28 
Q=500** 
-.374*** 
k=3 
Subgr.(k)=5 
Q=217*** 
 
/ .115† 
k=5 
Subgr.(k)=6 
Q=4 
-.031† 
k=11 
Subgr.(k)=39 
Q=776*** 
/ 
3 (-100;100) 
Days 
after/before  
announcement 
-.170***  
k=4 
Subgr.(k)=42 
Q=1,458*** 
-.158 
k=3 
Subgr.(k)=5 
Q=23*** 
 
.325** 
k=2 
Subgr.(k)=5 
Q=13** 
.040  
k=1 
Subgr.(k)=1 
Q=0 
-.137***  
k=9 
Subgr.(k)=53 
Q=1,515*** 
/ 
4 (Pre-) 
Acquisition  
performance 
.068***  
k=24 
Subgr.(k)=86 
Q=245*** 
-.083*  
k=7 
Subgr.(k)=12 
Q=73*** 
-.058†  
k=2 
Subgr.(k)=10 
Q=208*** 
-.162***  
k=6 
Subgr.(k)=8 
Q=24*** 
.020 
k=30 
Subgr.(k)=116 
Q=581*** 
-.042***  
k=10 
Subgr.(k)=17 
Q=3,319*** 
5 (Post-) 
Acquisition  
performance 
.012  
k=20 
Subgr.(k)=82 
Q=2,766*** 
-.060†  
k=11 
Subgr.(k)=55 
Q=216*** 
.194***  
k=7 
Subgr.(k)=43 
Q=84*** 
-.081**  
k=13 
Subgr.(k)=33 
Q=98*** 
.007 
k=31 
Subgr.(k)=213 
Q=3,199*** 
.049  
k=6 
Subgr.(k)=25 
Q=216*** 
Legend: †p < 0.10/ *p < 0.05/ **p < 0.01/ ***p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 5. Effect of relatedness on performance for target and acquiring firms (Cohen's d) 
Line Performance 
effects 
Business 
relatedness 
Culture 
relatedness 
Technology 
relatedness 
Size 
relatedness 
Relatedness 
Overall 
Absolute 
Size Acqui. 
1 Performance  
target firms 
.048 
k=9 
Subgr.(k)=40 
Q=333*** 
-.474*** 
k=3 
Subgr.(k)=3 
Q=185*** 
.043 
k=1 
Subgr.(k)=19 
Q=5 
-.071** 
k=1 
Subgr.(k)=47 
Q=136*** 
-.090*** 
k=12 
Subgr.(k)=63 
Q=595*** 
.023 
k=1 
Subgr.(k)=3 
Q=2 
2 Performance 
acquiring 
firms 
.016† 
k=18 
Subgr.(k)=214 
Q=5,107*** 
-.006* 
k=19 
Subgr.(k)=74 
Q=323*** 
.073** 
k=11 
Subgr.(k)=39 
Q=329*** 
-.040 
k=19 
Subgr.(k)=1 
Q=0 
.006 
k=61 
Subgr.(k)=374 
Q=5,918*** 
-.035*** 
k=12 
Subgr.(k)=39 
Q=3,538*** 
Legend: †p < 0.10/ *p < 0.05/ **p < 0.01/ ***p < 0.001  
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Table 6. Effect of relatedness on performance dependent on the knowledge-intensity of the 
industry (Cohen's d) 
Line Knowledge-
intensity of 
the 
industry 
Business 
relatedness 
Culture 
relatedness 
Technology 
relatedness 
Size 
relatedness 
Relatedness 
Overall 
Absolute 
Size Acqui. 
1 High-Tech 
industry 
.213*** 
k=5 
Subgr.(k)=10 
Q=78** 
.031 
k=2 
Subgr.(k)=7 
Q=2 
-.211*** 
k=4 
Subgr.(k)=25 
Q=118*** 
-.080 
k=4 
Subgr.(k)=11 
Q=17† 
.030 
k=10 
Subgr.(k)=53 
Q=265*** 
-.084** 
k=4 
Subgr.(k)=27 
Q=363*** 
2 High- & 
Low-Tech 
industry 
.006 
k=40 
Subgr.(k)=242 
Q=5,328*** 
-.149*** 
k=17 
Subgr.(k)=68 
Q=551*** 
.152*** 
k=17 
Subgr.(k)=33 
Q=177*** 
-.070* 
k=14 
Subgr.(k)=35 
Q=116*** 
-.005 
k=55 
Subgr.(k)=378 
Q=6,248*** 
-.027** 
k=9 
Subgr.(k)=15 
Q=3,175*** 
3 Low-Tech 
industry 
.595** 
k=1 
Subgr.(k)=2 
Q=0 
-.322 
k=1 
Subgr.(k)=2 
Q=0 
/ .049 
k=1 
Subgr.(k)=2 
Q=2 
.098 
k=2 
Subgr.(k)=6 
Q=11† 
/ 
4 Moderator 
indicated 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Legend: †p < 0.10/ *p < 0.05/ **p < 0.01/ ***p < 0.001  
 
 
Table 7. Effect of relatedness on performance dependent on acquisition size (Cohen's d) 
Line Acquisition 
size 
Business 
relatedness 
Culture 
relatedness 
Technology 
relatedness 
Size 
relatedness 
Relatedness 
Overall 
Absolute 
Size Acqui. 
1 Large  
M&As 
-.030* 
k=28 
Subgr.(k)=178 
Q=4,789*** 
-.097* 
k=7 
Subgr.(k)=22 
Q=83*** 
.144*** 
k=8 
Subgr.(k)=20 
Q=156*** 
-.063** 
k=10 
Subgr.(k)=25 
Q=49*** 
-.011 
k=39 
Subgr.(k)=245 
Q=5,115*** 
-.095** 
k=8 
Subgr.(k)=20 
Q=267*** 
2 Large & 
small  
M&As 
.062*** 
k=16 
Subgr.(k)=70 
Q=587*** 
-.167*** 
k=12 
Subgr.(k)=50 
Q=447*** 
-.163*** 
k=4 
Subgr.(k)=38 
Q=151*** 
-.079*** 
k=9 
Subgr.(k)=23 
Q=87*** 
.006 
k=25 
Subgr.(k)=182 
Q=1,340*** 
-.020† 
k=3 
Subgr.(k)=19 
Q=3,234*** 
3 Small  
M&As 
.057† 
k=2 
Subgr.(k)=6 
Q=37*** 
.057† 
k=2 
Subgr.(k)=6 
Q=37*** 
/ / .013 
k=3 
Subgr.(k)=11 
Q=69*** 
-.289*** 
k=2 
Subgr.(k)=3 
Q=15*** 
4 Moderator 
indicated 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Legend: †p < 0.10/ *p < 0.05/ **p < 0.01/ ***p < 0.001  
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Table 8. Effect of relatedness on performance for Regions (Cohen's d) 
Line Region Business 
relatedness 
Culture 
relatedness 
Technology 
relatedness 
Size 
relatedness 
Relatedness 
Overall 
Absolute 
Size Acqui. 
1 Global  
Acquirers 
.165*** 
k=9 
Subgr.(k)=23 
Q=193*** 
-.123*** 
k=10 
Subgr.(k)=27 
Q=110*** 
-.528*** 
k=2 
Subgr.(k)=7 
Q=53*** 
.012 
k=4 
Subgr.(k)=15 
Q=30** 
.005 
k=15 
Subgr.(k)=72 
Q=505*** 
-.035*** 
k=5 
Subgr.(k)=15 
Q=3,204*** 
2 US 
Acquirers 
-.001 
k=31 
Subgr.(k)=205 
Q=5,179*** 
-.156** 
k=5 
Subgr.(k)=31 
Q=189*** 
.164*** 
k=8 
Subgr.(k)=17 
Q=170*** 
-.125*** 
k=11 
Subgr.(k)=24 
Q=83*** 
.003 
k=41 
Subgr.(k)=277 
Q=5,675*** 
.073* 
k=5 
Subgr.(k)=24 
Q=225*** 
3 Europe 
Acquirers 
-.039 
k=6 
Subgr.(k)=23 
Q=26*** 
-.142** 
k=6 
Subgr.(k)=19 
Q=260*** 
.068* 
k=2 
Subgr.(k)=34 
Q=32 
.000 
k=4 
Subgr.(k)=9 
Q=17* 
-.042† 
k=11 
Subgr.(k)=88 
Q=343*** 
-.676*** 
k=3 
Subgr.(k)=3 
Q=38*** 
4 Moderator 
indicated 
Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Legend: †p < 0.10/ *p < 0.05/ **p < 0.01/ ***p < 0.001  
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Table 9. Synergy-effects of relatedness indicated as performance changes 
Performance 
Type/ 
Moderator 
Business 
relatedness 
Culture 
relatedness 
Technology 
relatedness 
Size 
relatedness 
Relatedness 
Overall 
Absolute 
Size 
Acqui. 
Overall  Moderate 
Positive 
Negative Positive Negative No Negative 
Financial 
Investors1 
No Negative Positive No No Strongly 
Negative 
Strategic 
Investors2 
Positive Negative Positive & 
Negative 
Negative No Mainly 
Positive 
Short-run3 Positive Moderate 
Negative 
/ Negative Moderate 
Positive 
Negative 
Long-run4 Moderate 
Negative 
Moderate 
Negative 
Positive Negative Negative No 
Target  No Strongly 
Negative 
/ / Negative / 
Acquirer Moderate 
Positive 
Moderate 
Negative 
Positive No No Negative 
High-Tech Strongly  
Positive 
/ Strongly 
Negative 
No No Negative 
Medium-Tech No Negative Positive Moderate 
Negative 
No Negative 
Large  
Acquirer 
Moderate 
Negative 
Moderate 
Negative 
Positive Negative No Negative 
Medium  
Acquirer 
Positive Negative Negative Negative No Moderate 
Negative 
Global  
Acquirer 
Positive Negative / No No Negative 
US  
Acquirer 
No Negative Positive Negative No Moderate 
Positive 
Europe  
Acquirer 
No Negative / No Moderate 
Negative 
Strongly 
Negative 
Legend:  
No= Not significant effects.  
Strongly = Effects bigger than +/-.300 with p < 0.001.  
Moderate = Effects with p < 0.10 and p < 0.01.  
/  = Sample size is smaller than 3 studies. 
1includes shareholder value 
2
 includes skill transfer & combination, longevity, accounting and overall performance 
3 includes pre-acquisition performance, (-2,2) and (-10,10) windows 
4 includes post-acquisition performance, (-100,100) window 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Operationalization of relatedness and firm size within the studies 
Business 
relatedness 
• 2 and 4-digit SIC industries measure of diversification, approach of Rumelt (1974): 
firms in different IO industries merge and the merging firms show no vertical 
relatedness 
 • 2 and 4-digit SIC industries measure of entropy, approach of Palepu (1985)  
 • Conglomerate/ Unrelated mergers as classified by the FTC, Rumelt (1974) typology 
 • Extent to which an acquiring firm's primary SIC codes were related to the target 
firm's primary SIC codes 
 • those in the same 2- or 3-digit industry as an acquirer's primary industry 
 • Combination potential 
• Extent of backward (supplier) and forward (processing or distributing) linkage 
 • Percentage of acquired assets of the same 2- digit SIC code as the acquirer 
 • Similarity between acquirers and targets on strategic variables 
 • Judges classified the acquisition as 'related' 
 • Interviews with managers 
 • Firms that produced similar products or served the same or similar customers 
 • Relatedness of the acquisition as indicated by respondents 
 • Expansion took place within a firms value-added chain … 
Culture 
relatedness 
• National cultural distance through the Kogut and Singh (1988) index based on the 
differences in country scores on each of Hofstede’s (1980) four dimensions of 
national culture, i.e., uncertainty avoidance, power distance, individualism, and 
masculinity 
 • Cultural differences index across several dimensions 
 • Cultural distance, based on Ronen and Shenkar's (1985) classification (RSINDEX; 
ranging from 1, when the host country belonged to the Nordic block, to 8, in the 
case of Africa). 
 • Crossborder mergers comparing the headquarters in different countries 
 • Domestic expansion, foreign expansion 
 • Share of international M&As in the total number of its M&As as registered 
according to the home country of the headquarters of companies during the period 
 • Comparing manager responses  
Technology 
relatedness 
• Diversity measure of breadth of the firm’s patent stock; citation count following 
Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001); each cited patent is identified by International 
Patent Class (IPC) and related to the distribution of its application across industries 
 • (Dis)similarity of the patent classification (IPC) code of the patents owned by the 
M&A partners at the three digit level 
 • Common technology base 
 • Presence of technological relationships between acquirer and target. 
 • List of patent numbers that appeared in both the acquired firm’s knowledge base and 
in the acquiring firm’s knowledge base 
Size 
relatedness 
• Ratio of target to acquirer assets/ revenues/ sales/ number of employees 
 • Scales ranging from "smaller in size" to "more than ten times the size." resp. from 
'smaller', '3-5 times the size', to 'more than 10 times the size' as indicated by 
respondents 
Absolute size 
Acquirer 
• Number of employees, assets, sales 
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Table A2. Operationalization of acquisition performance within the studies 
Shareholder 
value 
• Abnormal returns (CAR, MCAR), wealth effects, performance in market share, 
earning per share growth, Stock Returns, Percent change in market value 
Accounting 
performance 
• (Growth in) EBITDA, ROA, ROE, ROS, Sales, net income (after taxes), total 
assets  
 • Scales about growth in Sales etc. as indicated by respondents 
Skill transfer & 
combination 
• Leverage of innovation capabilities based on patent authorship data; when an 
inventor previously employed by the acquired firm is the author of a patent filed 
by the acquirer subsequent to the acquisition 
 • Knowledge leverage; post acquisition an acquirer’s patent citing an acquired firm 
patent 
 • Change in R&D intensity, new product intensity, number of patents, patent 
intensity growth 
 • Asking managers about skill transfer, resource transfer, new product development, 
performance in technological and commercial innovation, new R&D fields and 
sources etc. 
Overall 
acquisition 
performance 
• Items to capture the extent of synergy realization from a merger or acquisition, 
including realized benefits from purchasing, production, marketing, market power, 
administration, vertical economies, new market access, cross-selling, transfer of 
current know-how, creation of new know-how, and other substantial synergy 
sources that may be described in a case 
 • Expert evaluation (executives, analysts) of finanical and strategic benefits from 
the acquisition 
Longevity • Number of years that the venture persisted 
 • Acquired company was divested by the parent (yes/no) 
 
 
